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ABSTRACT 
In ethnic conflicts, the behaviour of political elites constitutes an 
important variable, both in the outbreak of conflict and in 
attempts to find solutions. Insisting on the importance of elites 
does not imply, however, that elite interests are the only driving 
force: the elites operate in structures of constraints and 
opportunities. In this article, the conflict between Serbia and 
Montenegro is analyzed. The conflict began as a conflict over 
political and economic reforms, but during the course of the 
conflict it has acquired different characteristics. In this process, 
ethnicity has come to play a more important role. These 
developments are partly due to intentional elite behaviour, but 
the process of dissociation has also acquired its own momentum 
which constrains the elites. The article argues that elite interests, 
interplay between the elites in Belgrade and Podgorica as well as 






In the fortunate cases when regulation of national and ethnic conflicts is 
successful, the first stages of such success are usually represented by television 
footage of men in dark suits solemnly signing agreements vowing to put the 
conflict behind them. The role of elites in such an event is crucial; they are the 
ones signing the agreement and the ones with the authority to, attempt to, 
implement it. These same elites may, however, not only be agents of peace they 
may very well have played an important role in causing the conflict and in its 
further development. Conflicts can serve elite interests in a number of ways, but 
even if they were to begin with the product of elites pursuing their interests these 
elites may later on find themselves constrained by the followers they have 






development of ethnic conflicts, one should therefore not only analyse relations 
between ethnic groups, but also dynamics within ethnic groups.  
 
In this article, the conflict between Serbia and Montenegro will be 
analysed with a specific focus on the role played by elites. Compared to the other 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the conflict between Serbia and Montenegro 
has taken on a rather different character. Most notably it has not turned into a 
violent conflict and this may in some part be influenced by a second 
distinguishing factor: the ethnic division between Montenegrins and Serbs is less 
clear than the ethnic divisions in the other conflicts. It is therefore debatable 
whether one should characterise the conflict as an ‘ethnic conflict’, but I will 
argue below that ethnicity has come to play a more important role and elite 
interests and dynamics within the two republics have been crucial in this 
development. 
 
Elites in Ethnic Conflicts  
 
In his influential book Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies, 
Eric Nordlinger argued that ‘Successful or unsuccessful regulation will be largely 
dependent on the purposeful behaviour of political elites’ (Nordlinger 1972: 4). 
The actions of elites are decisive for whether a conflict will continue or whether 
it is possible to reach some form of compromise. The elites are, however, not 
only important for the success or failure of conflict regulation, they may in turn 
have played an important role in the outbreak of conflict. As Benjamin Reilly 
argues, there is increasing evidence from many regions of ‘elite initiated conflict’ 
(Reilly 2001: 177). Elites cannot therefore necessarily be assumed to be more 
moderate than their followers (Horowitz 1985: 573-4), and their interests in the 
conflict are likely to shape its development. Even if conflicts were initially elite 
initiated this does not mean, however, that elites are unconstrained in their 
actions and their ability to compromise: they can be constrained by their 
followers, by competing elites within their own ethnic group as well as by the 
interplay with the elites of the opposing ethnic group(s).  
 
Despite the importance of elite willingness and ability to accept conflict 
regulation it is often assumed away or merely treated as an unanalysed 
precondition in the literature on conflict regulation: there is a focus on 
institutional engineering rather than on institutional choice (Reilly and Reynolds 
1999: 4-5). Theories on the timing of conflict regulation are not surprisingly 
mostly focused on the relations between the groups in the conflict. They focus on 
concepts such as ‘ripe moment’, ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, and ‘security 
dilemma’ (see e.g. Zartman 1995; Posen 1993). The key to bringing a conflict to 
end is, according to these accounts, that willingness to accept compromise is 
found simultaneously in both groups and this is primarily an effect of the 
interplay between the groups and possibly of international intervention to 
alleviate the security dilemma. The development of a conflict is, however, not 






only influenced by the relations between groups: a stalemate can last for years 
and a conflict can take a different course without the relations between groups 
being the driving force. The dynamics within the ethnic groups - between the 
elites, their followers and competing elites - are also of importance for when 
elites will see an interest in pursuing an accommodating strategy, and be able to 
follow those inclinations. As Horowitz argues, elites in ethnic conflicts cannot be 
expected to be monolithic: intra-ethnic competition is the norm and this will 
severely constrain elites (Horowitz 1985: 574). In addition, given such 
competition it will under some circumstances be strategic for elites to pursue 
more antagonistic strategies in order to again an advantage in the intra-ethnic 
competition.  
 
Therefore, insisting on the importance of elite behaviour in ethnic 
conflicts is not to argue for a purely voluntaristic approach. Elite positions in 
ethnic conflicts do not only reflect selfish interests since the elites will be 
constrained by other factors, and in order to analyse this we should focus on both 
relations between the groups and dynamics within the groups.  
 
Conflict in Serbia-Montenegro 
 
In the conflict between Serbia and Montenegro, elite interests and the 
interplay between Serbian and Montenegrin elites have been important for the 
development of the conflict. Elite interests have to a large extent been affected by 
dynamics within the two republics and especially elite competition in 
Montenegro has had a decisive impact on the course of the conflict. Since 
Montenegro’s policy of dissociation began in 1997, the dynamics of the conflict 
have gradually changed and it has taken on a different character. This change has 
in part been caused by the deliberative actions of elites, but they have also found 
themselves constrained by the momentum of the conflict. 
 
Until 1997, Montenegro was the mostly loyal junior partner of Slobodan 
Milošević’s Serbia and the leadership of the renamed communist party, the 
Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), posed no significant problems for 
Milošević’s power ambitions. However, in 1997 Milošević’s regime began to 
face increasing opposition and this resulted in a split in the DPS and the victory 
of the former Milošević-loyalist Milo Đukanović who had now decided to 
challenge him and embark on a reform-oriented course. The beginning 
dissociation was thus sparked by dissatisfaction with Milošević’s policies and 
authoritarianism: it was a regime-split and the predominant dynamics were not 
ethnic. Over the years, this gradual policy of dissociation resulted in Montenegro 
acquiring significant attributes of statehood, but contrary to expectations, this 
process was not reversed with the fall of Milošević; on the contrary, polarisation 
was increased. In March 2002, the so-called Belgrade Agreement was signed 
which creates a loose federation of two states and holds out the possibility of an 







Below, I will analyse the development of the conflict and the effect of 
the interplay between Belgrade and Podgorica as well as dynamics within 
Montenegro and Serbia. The analysis will be divided into: the 1997 split, the 
policy of gradual dissociation, developments post-Milošević and the 2002 
Agreement.     
 
The 1997 Split 
 
When the Former Yugoslavia started dissolving, Milošević needed to 
persuade Montenegro not to secede in order to legitimise his claim that the new 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was the successor state to the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In the early 1990s this did not 
present a significant problem, since Milošević had made sure in his ‘anti-
bureaucratic revolution’ that the republican leadership was loyal to him. The 
Federatiom was, however, dysfunctional from the outset and the Montenegrin 
Government on several occasions argued that Montenegrin interests were 
insufficiently protected. The two governments therefore became gradually more 
alienated from each other (Bieber 2003: 11), and as the consequences of war and 
Milošević’s isolationist policies were increasingly felt in Montenegro, a split in 
the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists began to be evident. The primary 
division was, however, not ethnic and the anti-Milošević faction also included 
people who could be regarded as pro-Yugoslav or even pro-Serb (Cerović 2001a: 
3). It was primarily a split within the regime over the need for reforms and co-
operation with the international community, but associated with this was the less 
explicit disagreement over the importance of the Federation: should the 
Federation be supported at any cost or were Montenegrin interests more 
important? 
During the winter of 1996-97, Milošević was faced with mass 
demonstrations which delegitimised his standing as a leader; he appeared weak 
and while Montenegrin President, Momir Bulatović, threw his weight behind 
Milošević, his opponents within the DPS became more vocal (Cerović 2001a: 3). 
In February 1997, Đukanović, who was the then Montenegrin Prime Minister, 
stated: ‘it would be completely wrong for Slobodan Milošević to remain in any 
place in the political life of Yugoslavia’ (Cerović 2001a:3). In July 1997, the DPS 
finally split when Đukanović’s faction managed to replace Bulatović as party 
president, and in October 1997 the two former friends Đukanović and Bulatović 
faced each other in the Montenegrin Presidential elections. Đukanović ran on a 
platform promising the voters economic and political reforms, minority rights 
and an end to international isolation. His election slogan implicitly acknowledged 
Montenegro’s place in the Federation: ‘Never alone, always its own’ (nika sami, 
uvijek svoj) (ESI 2000: 6). But while the campaign did not centre on separation 
or any form of nationalism, Bulatović nevertheless seized on its anti-Milošević 
stand and labelled Đukanović ‘anti-Yugoslav’ (Cerović 2001a: 3). The race was 
extremely close; Bulatović won the first round with a margin of just 2,200 votes, 






but in the second round the roles were reversed and Đukanović won a marginal 
victory. Đukanović owed his victory in large parts to his control of the media as 
well as the support of the democratic opposition which had decided to put their 
faith in the reformed apparatchik. The opposition had previously been divided 
over the issue of separation from Serbia, but chose to put its differences aside in 
order to pursue democratic reforms. In addition, the support of the Albanian and 
Bosniac voters proved significant, since they together constitute over 20 per cent 
of the Montenegrin population.   
The change in policy was marked for Đukanović who had invested 
almost his entire political career in the regime he had now set out to bring down. 
Rather than accepting the campaign discourse of the true democrat fighting the 
incorrigible dogmatists, his reversal should more likely be explained as a 
realisation that Milošević’s policy would ultimately be disastrous (Ivanović 
1998: 2). The regime showed signs of weakening and the political elites were 
increasingly pressured to deliver relief from the economic hardship brought on 
by the war and by international sanctions (ESI 2000: 7). After the victory of the 
Serbian opposition in Belgrade, many thought that the days of Milošević were 
numbered and this perception - while underestimating Milošević’s talent for 
holding on to power - worked as an incentive for a change in course. By taking 
an anti-Milosević stand, Đukanović could furthermore position himself in 
competition with Bulatović.  
 
Đukanović essentially adopted a platform that part of the democratic 
opposition had been advocating for years, but unlike them he was in a position to 
secure victory: he had the power apparatus behind him and he also possessed 
sufficient funds for an effective campaign. The change in course did therefore not 
necessarily reflect a significant change in public opinion. In the initial split and in 
the beginning dissociation from Belgrade, elite interests were decisive: 
Đukanović saw this as the right time to change course due to the ever-narrowing 
circle of power surrounding Milošević and due to the effects his policies had had 
on Montenegrin society. But even though it started out as a within-regime split 
over the issues of reforms, the labelling by Belgrade and Bulatović of Đukanović 
and the increased pressure from Belgrade, which was to follow in the years after 
Đukanović’s victory, gradually pushed the DPS closer to a separatist stance. This 
shift was, however, not solely forced upon the DPS by external forces but also 
owed something to internal dynamics in the Montenegrin party system.  
 
Gradual Policy of Dissociation 
  
Shortly after his inauguration in 1998, Đukanović issued a document 
outlining his visions for reforming the Yugoslav state. This document was 
entirely focused on economic and democratic reforms for all of the Yugoslav 
state, not merely for Montenegro: ‘This country is not being threatened by 
Montenegrin, or any other separatism, this country is being threatened by a long-






be ‘a challenge and a warning to the state authorities that this is the last hour for 
them to take responsibility for their people and state’ (Đukanović 1998). The 
response to this warning by Đukanović’s opponents in Montenegro and the 
regime in Belgrade was, however, continued labelling of his policies as separatist 
and anti-Yugoslav, and Milošević could thereby legitimise an ever increasing 
pressure on Montenegro (Cerović 2001a: 4).  
After Đukanović’s victory, the Federal Government stopped its 
budgetary exchanges with Montenegro and this was reciprocated by the 
Montenegrin Government which gradually stopped paying prescribed incomes 
into the Federal Budget (Centre for Liberal Democratic Studies 2000: 5). During 
the pre-election campaign for the 1998 early Parliamentary elections, Bulatović 
was appointed Yugoslav Prime Minister, and Belgrade was thereby signalling its 
clear preference to the Montenegrin voters. The Montenegrin Government, 
however, rejected his appointment and refused to work with him. After the 
elections, the Federal Government refused to acknowledge the newly appointed 
Montenegrin representatives to which the Montenegrin Government responded 
by denying the Federal Government as well as the Federal institutions the right to 
exercise any legitimate authority over Montenegrin territory (ICG 2000: 20-22). 
The pro-Yugoslav opposition was therefore in power in Belgrade but was 
without influence in Montenegro. Belgrade was openly supporting Bulatović’s 
Serbian People’s Party (SNP), the Serbian media devoted many efforts to seek to 
affect Montenegro opinion (OSCE 1998: 15-6), and the SNP functioned largely 
as a mouthpiece for Milošević’s policies.1  For Milošević the pressure on 
Đukanović was a convenient strategy; by labelling him a threat to the Yugoslav 
state he could undermine the demands for reforms and ultimately for his own 
resignation. Paradoxially, Milošević may therefore have seen an interest in 
increased separatism from Podgorica.   
The pressure from Belgrade and the Montenegrin opposition was 
ultimately self-fulfilling: the stance of the Montenegrin government became 
increasingly separatist and pro-independence. In August 1999, the Montenegrin 
Government adopted a ‘Platform’ which proposed the transformation of the FRY 
into a loose confederation of two equal partners, and then Prime Minister Filip 
Vujanović stated that this is ‘the level under which we will not go’ (Calhoun 
2000: 79). Gradually the Montenegrin Government assumed responsibilities that 
according to the FRY Constitution were set under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
state. The Government argued that this was a necessary step ‘in order to protect 
the economic and overall interests of the country and its citizens’ since the 
Federation was ‘openly or covertly, pursuing the agenda of Milošević’s 
antidemocratic rule’ (Đukanović 1999: 36). In this context, however, the country 
whose interests had to be protected was Montenegro rather than Yugoslavia.    
The most decisive break with Milošević’s policies came when 
Montenegro declared neutrality during the war in Kosovo. This further fostered 
allegations of ‘treason’ from Belgrade and intensified the propaganda war 
between Belgrade and Podgorica (Cerović 2001a: 5). After the war ended, the 
policy of dissociation continued: In the autumn of 1999, the Montenegrin 






Government declared fiscal sovereignty and took over both customhouses in 
Montenegro and introduced the Deutche Mark on equal footing with the 
Yugoslav dinar; later the D-Mark became the only legal tender in Montenegro 
(Centre for Liberal Democratic Studies, 2000: 5).2 On the Belgrade side, a trade 
blockade was imposed against Montenegro in early 2000, and in July 2000, the 
Federal Parliament adopted significant amendments to the FRY Constitution 
which substantially reduced Montenegrin representation and basically abolished 
the equality between the two republics in the Federation (ICG 2000: 26-29).  
Thus by 2000, Montenegro had acquired significant state-like attributes and the 
Federal institutions were almost indistinguishable from an extra layer of Serbian 
institutions. This process of dissociation owed a great deal to the actions of a 
Belgrade regime threatened by a reformist leader with a public mandate as well 
as international support. The divisions were furthermore increased by the 
perception in Podgorica that Milošević presented a military threat to Montenegro. 
Vojislav Šešejl, who was then Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, in 1999, warned 
that ‘Montenegrin independence will end in blood’ (Tadić 1999). In Montenegro, 
Milošević had created a special unit of the Yugoslav Army, the 7th battalion, 
composed of Montenegrins loyal to the Federal state. Tensions ran especially 
high during the war in Kosovo, and in May 1999, Djukanović argued that the 
generals of the Yugoslav army were not in Montenegro to save it, but ‘to 
implement the plans of an authoritarian regime’ (Ivanović 1999). In response, 
the Montenegrin Government had created a military police and the rhetoric of 
Đukanović gradually changed from one emphasising the threat from Belgrade as 
one of anti-democratic policies to a threat-image based on military security.  
The developments were however not only caused by the actions of 
Belgrade and the interplay with Montenegrin dissociation; internal dynamics in 
Montenegro were also of importance and these gradually changed due to the 
increased divisions between Belgrade and Podgorica. After the split of DPS, the 
relations between DPS and Bulatović’s SNP were decidedly bad and one of the 
main features of the 1998 election campaign was the extreme level of distrust, 
antagonism and mutual condemnation (OSCE 1998: 10-11). In response to the 
SNP’s labelling of the DPS as ‘anti-Yugoslav’, the DPS tried to cast the SNP into 
political isolation as an ‘anti-systemic’ and ‘anti-Montenegrin’ force (Strmiska 
2000: 4). The labelling of the conflict as one between Serbia and Montenegro 
was therefore also undertaken by the DPS. Đukanović was, however, not 
completely unconstrained in his increasingly separatist course: firstly, the rank 
and file of his party were more sceptical of the change in course (Ivanović 1998: 
3), secondly in order to maintain its favourable centrist position in the party 
system, the DPS also had to distinguish itself from the more separatist forces in 
the Liberal Alliance (LSCG) (Strmiska 2000: 4). For the 1998 parliamentary 
elections, the DPS chose to form a coalition with the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) and the People’s Party (NS). This was a conflictual coalition from the 
outset composed of the NS which while anti-Milošević was also pro-Yugoslav 
and the SDP which pressured the DPS to take a more separatist stance. Incentives 






change in public opinion. The conflict with Belgrade had slowly increased 
popular support for independence and increased the polarisation of Montenegrin 
society: Before the process of dissociation began, the number of supporters for 
Montenegrin independence ranged between 12 and 15 per cent of the electorate, 
but by September 1999, 43.9 per cent in a survey by Damar stated that they 
would vote for independence, while 38.9 per cent would vote against (Radulović 
1999). Thus, while Đukanović’s move towards independence was not 
unconstrained, the internal dynamics in Montenegro fostered incentives for an 
increasingly separatist stance.      
Furthermore, Đukanović’s dissent was strongly supported by Western 
powers that welcomed any basis of resistance against Milošević. And while 
Đukanović was simultaneously warned against declaring independence, the 
support nevertheless fuelled ambitions for exactly this independence (Cerović 
2001a: 4). In 2000, when the end of Milošević reign was nearing, Đukanović was 
faced with strong cross-pressures. He had taken an increasingly pro-
independence stance and Montenegro was close to having achieved de facto 
independence, and his coalition partner and an increasingly pro-independence 
electorate pressured him to take the final step and declare independence. The pro-
independence parties were gaining in strength and confidence and Đukanović 
was having increasing difficulty keeping his coalition together (Dick 2000: 7).  
At the same time, Đukanović was however warned against such a move 
by the international community and he was well aware of the possible dangers 
posed by a polarised Montenegrin population and by Milošević himself.  As he 
put it: ‘the reason we are so cautious is our awareness of the man with whom we 
live’ (Cohen 2000: 336), ‘secession might entail either an internal conflict or the 
risk, albeit a much smaller risk, of violent external aggression on Montenegro’ 
(Cohen 2000: 307). Due to this cross-pressure, Đukanović continued his policy 
of gradualism or fence-sitting while hoping that time would make the situation 
more beneficial.  In July 2000, he stated: ‘A growing number of people in 
Montenegro understand the essence of the democratic, reform-oriented, and 
European option offered by the current Montenegrin leadership, and there are 
less and less impassioned pro-Milošević people. That is why we will not pursue a 
policy of rash moves… but will carefully follow developments on the 
international and domestic – Montenegrin and Yugoslav – political stages’ (Dick 
2000: 3). Changes would however come before he knew it: In October 2000, 
Milošević acknowledged his defeat and with him the primary argument for 
Montenegrin independence disappeared. But by then, the process had gained its 





Prior to the fall of Milošević, the Montenegrin Government had stated 
that it could not wait for Serbia to become democratic, but now when the 
undemocratic regime had fallen the Government found itself in a dilemma 






(Cerović 2001a: 2). Given that the conflict had its primary roots in the 
aggressiveness of the Milošević regime, one could have expected that the regime-
shift would lead to a quick resolution. But many things had changed since the 
process of dissociation started three years earlier. The Montenegrin Government 
and their allies had ‘tasted some of the fruits of de facto independence’(Roberts 
2002: 6); the experience of de facto independence had fostered a political, 
business, and intellectual elite with strong interest in continued separation from 
Serbia (Simić 2002: 203). With the disappearance of the military threat from 
Serbia, formal independence suddenly seemed within the reach and Đukanović 
was pressured by both voters and political allies.  
During Milošević’s rule, the Montenegrin Government and the Serbian 
opposition had co-operated but their relationship had become strained by the 
decision of the Montenegrin Government to boycott the 2000 elections and by 
what the Montenegrin Government perceived as insufficient critique by the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) to the constitutional changes.3 These 
grievances were exacerbated by DOS’s coalition with the SNP, which was 
necessary to obtain a majority in the Federal Parliament. Moreover, polls taken 
shortly after the fall of Milošević point to increased, not reduced, support for 
Montenegrin independence: in October 2000, the Centre for Democracy and 
Human Rights (CEDEM) found that 48.1 per cent would vote ‘yes’ in an 
independence referendum, while 39.9 per cent would ‘no’ (Šćekić 2000). Rather 
than rebuilding the bridges with Serbia, Đukanović chose to openly declare his 
desire to turn Montenegro into an independent state and the main committee of 
the DPS proposed that Serbia and Montenegro become two internationally 
recognised sovereign states (Tadić 2000). The result of the fall of Milošević was 
therefore increased polarisation within Montenegro over the issue of statehood 
(Roberts 2002: 5; Bieber 2002: 1).  
In December 2000, the Montenegrin Government issued a ‘Revised 
Platform’ which envisaged a very loose confederation between Serbia and 
Montenegro. Compared to the 1999 Platform this structure had even fewer links 
between the two republics: it was a union of two fully independent and 
internationally recognised states (Government of Montenegro 2000; Cerović 
2001a: 8). However, not all parties in the anti-Milošević camp supported the 
continued move towards independence, and the NS chose to leave the 
Government and join the pro-Yugoslav coalition. The split in the governing 
coalition led to early parliamentary elections in 2001, which left Đukanović’s 
Government dependent on the separatists in LSCG for its parliamentary majority. 
The LSCG forced the DPS to promise to hold an independence referendum 
within the following year and Đukanović was therefore constrained in his pro-
independence stand, despite the reduced popular support for the pro-
independence parties. The DPS adopted an increasingly strident pro-
independence stand and at its 2001 congress the party statute and programme was 
changed deleting all references to the Yugoslav Federation and pledging an effort 
to secure independence for Montenegro (DPA 2001). Đukanović was, however, 






rumours of splits within his own party over the issue (See e.g. Centre for 
Democracy and Human Rights 2002a;  ICG 2001: 22). In addition, the pro-
independence stand ran counter to a change in the international climate: the EU 
and the US strongly warned Montenegro against seeking independence, which 
they argued could open a Pandora’s Box in the Former Yugoslavia by opening 
anew border disputes. Once again, Đukanović therefore found himself playing 
for time and hoping for the emergence of a friendlier domestic and international 
environment (ESI 2001: 3). 
In Belgrade, the issue of future Serbian-Montenegrin relations played 
into the power struggle between President Vojislav Koštunica and Prime Minister 
Zoran Đinđić (Cerović 2001a:8). Đinđić saw an interest in preserving the 
unresolved status quo; he could pursue his own agenda while Koštunica’s 
political star slowly waned and he was therefore largely passive in attempts to 
reach a solution (ESI 2001: 6). Koštunica, on the other hand, was more 
constrained than Đinđić: firstly, his post as Yugoslav President depended on a 
resolution of the Montenegrin issue; secondly, he was constrained by his 
ideological commitment to Yugoslavia (ESI 2001:7). At the same time, reformist 
forces were pressing for a solution, since the unresolved constitutional situation 
was seen as a hindrance to necessary reforms and therefore to international 
financial assistance. In early 2001, the Yugoslav Parliament adopted a proposal 
drafted by Koštunica which envisaged a reestablishment of the Federation. This 
proposal was, however, not well received in Podgorica where Đukanović argued 
that ‘In many aspects this proposal puts Montenegro in a worse position than it 
was according to the Constitution of 1992’ (Đukanović 2001).  
In October 2001, Đukanović, Koštunica and Đinđić met in Belgrade and 
they concluded that their positions were irreconcilable. Koštunica stated that ‘this 
practically means that the Montenegrin public should vote on the issue in a 
referendum’ (ESI 2001: 1). The scene therefore looked set for a final test of 
Montenegrin public opinion and the dissolution of the third Yugoslavia seemed 
to be nearing. Thus, the fall of Milošević did not bring with it a resolution of the 
Serbian-Montenegrin conflict: the dynamics of the conflict had changed, the 
process had gained its own momentum, the population in Montenegro was 
polarised, and important political elites had interests in the continued separation 
of the two republics.   
 
Belgrade Agreement: The Creation of ‘Solania’ 
 
In late 2001, Serbia and Montenegro were therefore close to approving a 
Montenegrin referendum on independence. This however fuelled EU and US 
fears over the stability of the region and the EU chose to send its diplomatic 
heavyweight, Javier Solana, to prevent such a development. Both sides are 
heavily dependent on financial aid from international donors and especially 
Đukanović, who had all along cast himself as pro-Western, had little room to 
manoeuvre (Roberts 2002: 2, 7). In addition, the pressure from the EU may have 
been the possibility for back-tracking that he had been looking for given the 






persisting divisions in Montenegro (van Meurs 2003: 64). Solana could therefore 
make Đukanović back away from his commitment to hold an independence 
referendum in the spring of 2002, and after lengthy negotiations, the parties on 
14 March 2002 finally reached agreement on new relations between the two 
republics. The so-called Belgrade Agreement sets up a very loose federation with 
the new name “Serbia and Montenegro”, and it specifies that after three years, 
either republic can hold a referendum on independence.    
With the Belgrade Agreement, Đukanović had agreed to put 
Montenegrin independence on hold for at least the next three years, and while 
Đukanović sought to present it as a step on Montenegro’s road to independence, 
it caused uproar among his coalition partners, the SDP and LSCG, and the LSCG 
described the Agreement as an act of ‘great treason’ (Centre for Democracy and 
Human Rights 2002b: 4). After the initial shock, the SDP was eventually 
persuaded by Đukanović to back his stand, but the LSCG withdrew its support 
for the Government which thereby lost its parliamentary majority. The pro-
Yugoslav coalition initially reacted with satisfaction, but then became somewhat 
bewildered by the Serbian perception of the agreement as a victory for 
Đukanović and a harbinger of Montenegrin independence (Roberts 2002: 3). 
Surprisingly, the separatist LSCG chose to coalesce with the pro-Yugoslav 
coalition in a bid to defeat Đukanović in the early parliamentary elections on 20 
October 2002. This shift once again underlines the fluidity of the Montenegrin 
conflict and furthermore illustrates that the LSCG may be more intent on 
destroying Đukanović and the DPS than on achieving independence (Roberts 
2002: 9). The party, however, failed to bring its voters along and was harshly 
punished in the elections in which the LSCG lost two of their six seats and 
almost a third of their votes. The big winner of the elections was Đukanović’s 
coalition, the ‘Democratic List for a European Montenegro’, which secured 39 
out of 75 seats in support of its middle-of-the-road course. This left Đukanović in 
a strong position for the implementation of the agreement; he no longer relied on 
the support of the erratic LSCG and he apparently had the voters behind him. The 
Belgrade Agreement has thereby so far proved to be a solution capable of 
winning popular support in Montenegro. According to a poll by CEDEM in April 
2002, 61.1 per cent supported the agreement while 23.0 per cent were against. At 
the same time, 42.4 per cent would still vote ‘yes’ in a referendum on 
independence, while 40.2 per cent would vote ‘no’, and the divisions over the 
future status of Montenegro therefore persist (CEDEM April 2002).  
In Serbia, the agreement was widely seen as a victory for Đukanović and 
as a stepping stone to Montenegrin independence, or at best a sticking-plaster 
solution (Roberts 2002: 2). Serbian Justice Minister, Vladen Batić, argued that 
Montenegro was only biding their time before going their own way 
(Beograd.com 27 December 2002). Miroljub Labus, President of G17 Plus, 
echoed this sentiment when he argued that Solana had carried out his mediator 
mission ‘badly’ and had been biased in favour of Montenegro; ‘Brussels’ actions 
are not helping preserve the joint state’ (Beograd.com 17 December 2002). 






unworkable and therefore frustrate the reform process, extreme nationalists 
described the agreement as a sell-out (Roberts 2002: 2).  
The conflict however also fed into the ongoing power struggle between 
Đinđić and Koštunica, and changes in their relative power have affected the 
implementation of the agreement. In order to consolidate his power, Koštunica 
chose to run for the Serbian presidency, however due to insufficient voter turnout 
both the first and the second ballot were declared invalid. This gave Đinđić 
incentives to push for the implementation of the agreement, since Koštunica 
thereby lost his power base as Yugoslav president and the new Serbian-
Montenegrin state looked set to be dominated by an alliance run by Đinđić and 
Đukanović (Cvijanović 2003). After Đinđić’s assassination, the future 
distribution of power in Serbia remains uncertain and this is bound to also affect 
the new state structure.   
It is still too early to tell what will happen after the three year 
interregnum after which an independence referendum can be held. However, 
there are some indications. In his inaugural speech in January 2003, Đukanović 
predicted that Montenegro would be an independent state within three years 
(Radulović 2003).4 In terms of internal politics in Montenegro, Đukanović is in a 
strong position and his pro-independence bloc will be able to shape the political 
environment and set the political agenda over the next three years. In Serbia, 
power is being consolidated at the Serbian level, which could also signal that 
Montenegrin independence has merely been put on hold (Roberts 2002: 9). In 
addition to the future political competition in Serbia, a crucial factor will be the 
position of the EU: will the EU accept that ‘Solania’ will cease to exist after three 
years or are we to witness another round of arm twisting? 
 
Ethnicity in the conflict 
 
The conflict between Serbia and Montenegro started out as a within-regime split 
over the need for reforms. It could therefore seem erroneous to characterise the 
conflict as an ethnic conflict and in the literature on the conflict, ethnicity is 
usually argued to be of secondary importance (e.g. Calhoun 2000: 64). I will, 
however, argue that ethnicity plays an increasingly important role in the conflict, 
but this is ethnicity of a very fluid nature which affects the dynamics of the 
conflict.  
In the Yugoslav census, the distinct nationality of Montenegrins was 
acknowledged and in 1991 the composition of the republic was a follows: 61.8 
pct Montenegrins, 14.6 pct Muslims, 9.3 pct Serbs, 6.7 pct Albanians and 4.2 pct 
Yugoslavs. These numbers are however quite misleading since the Montenegrin 
category can reflect a national identity, a regional identity or even a dual identity. 
Many of the people who fall into this category will therefore regard themselves 
as ‘Montenegrin Serbs’ or as ‘Montenegrin Yugoslavs’.5 There is furthermore an 
element of fluidity which is illustrated if we compare the 1991 census with the 
census from 1981 in which 68.5 pct declared themselves to be Montenegrin and 
only 3.3 pct declared themselves as Serbs (Isaković 2000: 146). The upsurge of 






Serbian nationalism in the intermediate period surely holds some of the 
explanation for this change and it reflects the diversity of the ‘Montenegrin’ 
category.  
Two related factors point to the lack of importance of ethnicity in the 
conflict: The people who see themselves as Montenegrins are split on the issue of 
Montenegrin independence and Đukanović’s pro-independence government 
attracts multiethnic support. Given the divisions among the Montenegrins, 
Đukanović had to rely on attracting the minority groups to his policies of 
dissociation from Belgrade, reforms and minority rights. Based on similar 
reasoning, Florian Bieber therefore argues that ‘political divisions do not follow 
ethnic lines’ (Bieber 2002: 7). Andrei Simić likewise contends that the conflict 
reflects ‘a schism within Montenegrin society itself’ rather than ‘a cleavage 
between Serbs and Montenegrins’ (Simić 1997: 122).  
The split in 1997 was, however, not a complete u-turn in Serb-
Montenegrin relations; it had its precedent in the conflict after the First World 
War between the Whites and Greens; between proponents of Montenegro’s 
Serbdom and integration into Serbia, and supporters of Montenegrin identity and 
independence (Isaković 2000: 265. Bieber 2003: 28). Underlying the close 
relations between Montenegrins and Serbs, differences had remained and these 
differences were primarily based on state traditions and political choice. Identity 
is closely connected with political affiliation (Pavlović 2003: 101), and the 
divisions among the people who regard themselves as Montenegrins can 
therefore to some extent be seen as a division between ‘Montenegrin Serbs’ and 
‘Montenegrin Montenegrins’. Based on this fluid and even dual nature of 
Montenegrin identity, Srdjan Darmanović describes Montenegro’s dilemma as 
that of a ‘national homo duplex’, a victim of a ‘double or divided national 
consciousnesses’ (Roberts 2002: 4). 
Though there were historic precedents, the 1997 split was, nevertheless, 
not a direct continuation of the conflict between the ‘Whites’ and the ‘Greens’, 
since the People’s Party (NS) which sees itself as being part of the ‘White’ 
tradition, also supported the dissociation from Belgrade.6 But since the split in 
1997, the dynamics of the conflict and the accompanying rhetoric has undergone 
a change and the divide between Montenegrins and Serbs has become clearer. 
After the regime change in Belgrade, the discourse of the pro-independence 
parties had to change to reflect the changed situation. Rather than pointing to the 
undemocratic nature of the Yugoslav regime and the military threat posed by 
Milošević, the Montenegrin Government increasingly started to emphasise the 
Montenegrin right to independent statehood. The claim for independence was 
justified by pointing to Montenegro’s state tradition, its negative experience with 
three Yugoslav states, its stable democratic institutions, its harmonious inter-
ethnic relations, and finally by pointing to the decision of the Badinter 
Commission (Simić 2002: 204-5. See also Đukanović 2001). In the 2001 election 
campaign, the pro-independence parties continued to portray Serbia as a threat 
waiting in the shadow to counter any pro-independence moves; by force if 






statements that might be interpreted as hegemonic or nationalistic (Cerović 
2001b ). But there were also attempts to discover new roots of Montenegrin 
identity (Cerović 2001b ). At the DPS conference in October 2001, Đukanović 
stated that without independence, Montenegro would be condemned to disappear 
as a state and as a nation (DPA 2001). Earlier that year, Đukanović similarly 
argued that a union of two independent states would ‘enable the preservation of 
the state and national identity both of Montenegro and Serbia’ (Đukanović 
2001). Interestingly, the unit whose national identity needs to be preserved is the 
Montenegrin state not the Montenegrin nation. This could seem to be a confusion 
of concepts but it of course reflects the multiethnic basis of Đukanović’s 
government as well as the ambiguous nature of Montenegrin identity.  
Given the increased importance of ethnicity and the attempts to create a 
distinct Montenegrin identity, the competition and divisions within the pro-
independence bloc can be seen as intra-ethnic divisions. A similar 
characterisation can be used for the dynamics within the pro-Yugoslav bloc. The 
continued fluidity of Montenegrin identity, however, affects these dynamics that 
take on a different character than in more rigidly divided conflicts. It allows for a 
more fluid political system in which possible alliances are not preordained, and 
this reduces the risk that the conflict will be frozen in a prolonged stalemate. This 
was well illustrated by the changing alliances after Milošević’s fall: had the 
conflict been strictly organised along ethnic lines, the shift of the NS from the 
pro-independence Government to the pro-Yugoslav coalition would have been 
highly unlikely. However, with this change, the divide between the Whites and 
the Greens was re-established and political choice and national affinities became 
more closely connected.    
Furthermore, the fluidity also restricts more exclusive appeals to group 
identity and therefore permits the appeal to be extended to other ethnic groups. 
The DPS appeals to voters without a uniform identity (Pavlović 2003: 102) and 
its appeals to national identity are therefore cast in a fairly ambiguous or even 
diffuse language. Some of the other pro-independence parties, however, appeal to 
voters that are more unambiguously Montenegrin and for example the very 
separatist Liberal Alliance more clearly emphasises the distinct national identity 
of the Montenegrins and has made accusations of Serbian cultural assimilation 
(Simić 1997: 127).  
The importance of elite interests in this conflict need not be decisively 
different from the other conflicts and wars in the former Yugoslavia. But the 
elites in Serbia and Montenegro had already been warned of the possible 
consequences if the conflict turned violent. Their power-seeking motivations and 
pragmatism may have made them better able to step back from the abyss, and the 
policy of gradualism prevented them from painting themselves into a corner. The 
greater fluidity of identity made conflict mobilisation more difficult and therefore 
constrained the elites: it helped prevent the extreme spiralling of conflict and 
therefore at the same time gave the elites more freedom; for backtracking, 
compromising and changing alliances. This, I would argue, is more important for 






the prevention of a violent conflict than NATO’s promise to protect Montenegro 
in case of a military attack from Belgrade.  
 
Conclusion: Elites Interests and Changed Conflict Dynamics 
 
What started out as a conflict over democratic and economic reforms 
gradually transformed itself into a conflict over Montenegrin statehood cast in 
the language of Montenegrin rights and identity. The explanation for this change 
in the conflict is to be found in both the interplay between the elites in Serbia and 
Montenegro and the internal dynamics in Montenegro and Serbia. The interplay 
between Serbia and Montenegro as well as international involvement have been 
important for the course of the conflict, but the fall of Milošević showed that 
other dynamics were also at play. Internal dynamics in Montenegro and Serbia 
seem to have been as decisive for the development of the conflict as the relations 
between Serbia and Montenegro. Elite interests have been crucial in the conflict; 
interests in initiating the conflict and in casting it in separatist terms as well as in 
prolonging it. The political leaders have, however, not been unconstrained; they 
have been constrained by internal competition and by their former actions and 
rhetoric.   
The Montenegrin conflict shares similarities with other conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, but there are also important differences. Like the conflicts in 
Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo it is a conflict over statehood and there is a sizeable 
Serbian minority within the republic which has received more or less overt 
support from Belgrade. However, both the relations with Belgrade and within 
Montenegro differ from the other conflicts: the conflict has not turned violent and 
the ethnic identities are more fluid. These factors are most probably related in 
that the lack of clear division is likely to have decreased the risk of violence, and 
the absence of violence has in turn avoided the freezing of identities that we have 
seen in other conflicts. The latter interplay illustrates the contextual nature of 
ethnicity; the ethnic identities in Montenegro have been affected by the course of 
the conflict, which has in large part been caused by elite interests and elite 
competition. This does not mean that these developments have been 
unconstrained, that elites can freely manipulate the course of a conflict, but it 
nevertheless points to ethnic conflicts being strongly affected by elite interests as 
well as by contingencies and unintended consequences caused by internal elite 





1 This schism between the party’s Montenegrin origins and its Belgrade loyalties led to a 
split in the party after the fall of Milošević and the victory of the Montenegrin-based 
wing.  








3 Before Kostunica became DOS’s presidential candidate, Đukanović had even been 
offered to lead the opposition against Milošević, but he declined the offer.  
4 Đukanović has stepped down as Montenegrin President and has instead taken the post 
as Prime Minister.  
5 The proportion who regards themselves as ‘Montenegrin Serbs’ is usually estimated to 
be around 20 pct. (E.g. Filipović, 2001)  
6 The NS had among its goals to ‘assert the Serbian ethos in Montenegro’ 
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